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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FLORIDA
LIMITATION ON LOCAL PROPERTY TAX
RATE FOR EDUCATION VIOLATES EQUAL
PROTECTION
A three-judge district court in Hargrave v. Kirk' held that a
Florida statute2 which conditions state aid to local education on the
school district not assessing more than a maximum ad valorem tax
for education violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The Florida constitution specifies that a school board may impose a
county millage not to exceed ten mills without voter approval;3 in
addition, the eligible voters within a district may, by vote, authorize
the school board to levy an additional district millage.4 The Millage
Rollback Act5 provided that the aggregate of a local system's district
and county ad valorem tax millage could not exceed ten mills if it were
to be eligible for state Minimum Foundation Program6 funds. The
statute resulted in a decreased millage in many counties and reduced
local ad valorem tax revenue for education by over fifty million
dollars ,state-wide.7 Following enactment, the "wealthiest" county
could raise $725 per student from property taxes at the maximum ten
mill rate while the "poorest" county could raise only $52 per student
because of the differences in tax bases.8 Concluding that the resulting
discrimination between individuals in "wealthy" and "poor"
counties had no rational basis, the court held that the Act violated the
equal protection clause.
A major portion of the revenue to support public schools is
derived from local property taxes.9 Florida is one of the 35 states
1. 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 21,
1970) (No. 573).
2. Millage Rollback Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.251 (Supp. 1970).
3. FLZA. CONST. art. Vll, § 9.
4. Id.
5. FLA. STAT.ANN. § 236.251 (Supp. 1970).
6. See generally id. § 236.07 (statutory basis of state aid to local school systems).
7. 313 F. Supp. at 950.
8. A "wealthy" county is one which, because of the combination of high property valuation
and fewer school age children, will derive the highest amount of revenue per mill of ad valorem
tax per student.
9. C. BENSON, THE CHEERFUL PROSPECT: A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 44 (1965).
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which has a maximum millage which can be levied to fund current
educational expenses;10 however, most of these states have a provision
whereby the local district can increase its levy above the maximum."
Seventeen states have established millage rates which vary within the
state depending on school organization or population. 2 State funds
provide the other major source of revenue for education." Florida's
Minimum Foundation Program" is an "equalizing" plan whereby
the state fixes a minimum amount to be expended per educational
unit'5 and provides the district with funds equal to the difference
between the minimum and the amount derived from a hypothetical
three mill ad valorem tax. The Millage Rollback Act,' in addition to
limiting the permissible millage assessments, provided that any school
district which failed to increase its revenue over the previous year by
$1200 per educational unit because of the ten mill limitation would
receive state funds to insure that the local budget was increased in
1968-69.17
10. M. REMMLEIN, TAX LIMITATION LAWS 9 (1965). For example, N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, § 10, places a limit on ad valorem taxes for all purposes including education. Within
the maximum, the actual tax level is left to the appropriate local governmental unit's dis-
cretion. Separate procedures and limits are generally established for capital expenditures.
11. M. REMMLEIN, supra note 10, at 10. Nine states have no such provision.
12. Id. at 9. For example, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20751 (West 1969), imposes a maximum
millage that varies between districts depending on the school organization within a particular
district.
13. The financial schemes of the states are of three categories: variable equalizing, whereby
the state makes grants to equalize the revenue available in school districts; variable
nonequalizing, whereby the grants vary between districts but on some basis other than local
revenue; and fixed grants to each district. A. MUNSE, STATE PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
SUPPORT 95 (1965). The revenue available for education is a function of local district wealth plus
the amount of state aid. Local wealth may vary substantially, creating intrastate disparities in
the revenue created by local taxes. Equalizing grants will tend to raise the expenditure level in the
poor counties while not changing the amount of revenue in wealthy counties; fixed grants are
anti-equalizing because each county receives the same amount of state aid. Variable
nonequalizing grants may or may not equalize intrastate differences in available revenue.See A.
WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR SCHOOLS 130 (1968); Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational
Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L.
REv. 305, 312 (1969). Federal funds provide some support for public schools but, except for
certain areas, do not account for a large percentage.
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.07 (Supp. 1970).
15. An education unit considers the type of instruction, number of students, facilities, and
instructors. Id.
16. Id. § 236.251.
17. The Florida legislature deleted this provision in 1970 but at the same time added section
236.072, which provides that if the yield per mill per student from local property taxes is below
the state average, the state will provide funds in addition to Minimum Foundation Program
grants. 2 FLA. SESS. LAWS SERV. ch. 70-94 (West, 1970). This amendment was enacted after the
original section 236.251 was declared unconstitutional in the instant action. The section still
imposes the ten mill limitation on local millage. Id.
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES
Any scheme of limitations on the taxing powers of local
governmental units must be able to withstand judicial scrutiny. The
role of judicial review is to guarantee that individuals share equally in
the privileges and liabilities established by a government unless a
rational basis exists for different treatment. 8 The courts, by requiring
that classifications resulting in unequal treatment promote a valid
state interest, preserve the integrity of the political process. 9 The
traditional equal protection test is satisfied if a statute's classification
is reasonably related to apermissible state purpose.2 A second, more
stringent standard has been used to review some state statutes and
requires that the state demonstrate a close connection between the
classification and a compelling state interest 2 where the type of
classification is suspect or the affected interest is termed
fundamental.2 Suspect classifications include those based on race,2
geography,' and wealth;2s race is especially suspect.2 Those interests
essential to an individual's participation in self government are
considered fundamental. On a scale of judicial importance, voting
would be a most fundamental interest zs while a property interest
would not normally have such a fundamental quality.? Therefore, as
the classification becomes less suspect, the interest must become more
fundamental to trigger the strict standard; less suspect classifications
18. C. BAY STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM 373 (1958).
19. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
20. See Developments in the Law-Eqital Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Equal Protection Developments]. See generally Tussman & tenBrock, The
Equal Prote~tion of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rev. 341 (1949).
21. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).
22. Cox, 1965 Term Foreword: Constitutional A djudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights,80 HARV. L. REv.91 (1966).
23. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally Fiss, Racial Imbalance in
the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564, 576 (1965); Kurland,
Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U.
Cm. L. REv. 583,584 (1968); Equal Protection Developments 1087.
24. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). See generally McKay, Political Thickets
and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. Rev. 645, 681-82
(1963); Equal Protection Developments 1181.
25. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 19 (1955). See generally Cox, supra note 22, at 92; Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A
Telophase ofSubstantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39,75.
26. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
27. See Lacas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713,736-37 (1964).
28. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
Vol. 1970:10331 1035
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
when combined with non-fundamental interests will be reviewed under
the traditional equal protection test.
Intrastate educational inequalities which involve both a
fundamental privilege" and suspect classifications based on wealth
and geography arguably should be reviewed under a strict standard.3:
In Hobson v. Hansen3 Judge Skelly Wright indicated that the state
had the burden of explaining why the poor and the Negro were
generally in the lower ranks of a "track" educational program.32 In
discussing the reduction of state aid to school districts receiving
federal impact fundssa one court has argued that such state action
denied certain individuals the same educational privileges as others in
the state and resulted from a geographic classification which effected
"discrimination without justification."u In Mclnnis v. Shapiro
plaintiffs argued that Illinois' public school finance statutes" violated
the equal protection clause where the state supplemented local revenue
with a fixed grant per student and a variable grant to insure a
minimum expenditure per student. The relief requested was a court
order requiring that each student receive the same dollar
appropriation. The court determined that the Constitution did not
require public school expenditures to be equalized or made only on the
basis of educational need. 37 Therefore, classifications designed to
facilitate decentralized administration were reasonable even though
intrastate disparities in educational expenditures resulted.
Alternatively, the court found that "judicially manageable
standards" to deterinine if the Constitution were being violated were
29. The proposition that education is a fundamental privilege can be derived from Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), where the Court said: "In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be cxpected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493.
30. See generally A. WisE, supra note 13, at 163; Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 13,
at 382; EqualProtection Developments 1187.
31. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
32. 269 F. Supp. at 513.
33. 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1964).
34. Douglas Independent School Dist. No. 3 v. Jorgenson, 293 F. Supp. 849, 854 (D.S.D.
1968).
35. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 1i1. 1968), affdper curiam sub noma. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969).
36. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 18-1 to 18-16 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
37. See 293 F. Supp. at 334-36.
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lacking because equal educational expenditures could not be equated
with equal education.38
The plaintiffs in Hargrave argued that the Millage Rollback Act 3l
violated the equal protection clause because the total allowable local
educational tax levy was based solely on the amount of taxable
property in the county and not on its educational needs. 40 Using the
traditional equal protection test, the court determined that the
classification inherent in the statute-a classification related to the
taxable property base-had no rational connection with a legitimate
state goal. Although the state has a legitimate interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of its programs, it could not further this interest by
invidious discrimination between classes of its citizens. The court
declined to consider the "education as a fundamental right" thesis
which would have activated the concomitant requirement of a
compelling state interest to justify any legislation which created
unequal classifications in education. Distinguishing Hargrave from
Mclnnis v. Shapiro," the court opined that even if the state could
allocate revenue on some basis other than educational need, it could
not prohibit local residents from seeking to provide their children with
a better education. Thus, although both Florida and Illinois had
intrastate variations between districts in the money available for
education, the Florida Act was unconstitutional because it did not
allow 16cal residents to determine their own tax burdens as could
citizens of Illinois.
Apparently, the disability in the Millage Rollback Act42 was its
denial to local residents of the opportunity to determine educational
expenditures. The equal protection clause was interpreted as requiring
that local residents be given the privilege of spending more money
when the state finances education in a manner which creates intrastate
38. Id. at 335.
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2362.51 (Supp. 1970).
40. 313 F. Supp. at 948. Prior to the discussion of the equal protection issue the court
considered the defenses offered by the defendant. While acknowledging that equal expenditures
would not necessarily result in equal education, the decision assumed that there were unequal
educational opportunities in the state because of the wide financial disparities between counties.
Because several counties did have a millage above ten mills prior to the Act, the court felt that if
local residents could vote, equalization in the revenue available for education might result. While
the counties were not absolutely prohibited from increasing their millage above ten mills since
the district could do so by forfeiting state aid, a state could not be permitted to condition a
benefit on a condition violative of the equal protection clause. Id. at 947.
41. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.251 (Supp. 1970). See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
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educational inequalities. This implies that inequalities in education
are valid if a majority of those adversely affected do not want to
correct the inequality themselves.43 The decision, evidently allowing
the local governmental unit to preserve educational inequalities while
denying the state the same power, implied that administrative sub-
units of the state have a sovereign'status. Normally, such action by a
local government would be imputed to the state," and it is difficult to
understand why the classifications which are invalid when created by
the legislature are not a denial of equal protection when validated by a
local government.
The court in Mclnnis v. Shapiro45 held that any valid state interest
being served by the statute would make the classification reasonable.
The Hargrave court, however, acknowledged Florida's legitimate
interest in "preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs," an interest
which could be reflected in a limit on total educational expenditures.
The classifications inherent in the Millage Rollback Act were the
result of a state policy of decentralized administration similar to the
system created by the Illinois financial scheme; however, since
Hargrave describes the resulting discriminatory classification as
invidious, there is the implication that the state would be required to
show that the statute served a compelling interest. The court, while
purporting to use the traditional equal protection test, apparently
applied a stricter standard to invalidate the statute which created
classifications much like those which were constitutional under the
conventional standard in Mclnnis. Even if the tests applied in each
case appear to differ, the actual distinction between Hargrave and
Mclnnis should be made on the issue of justiciability. The Mclnnis
position on the equal protection issue can be considered dicta since the
court's alternate holding, that the case did not present a justiciable
issue, made a consideration of the merits of the equal protection
theory unnecessary. The court in Hargrave was not forced to assume
that equal expenditures could produce equal education in order to
find a violation of the equal protection clause. Rather, because
the classifications inherent in the Millage Rollback Act" were clearly
43. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (right to vote-majority
at no level can validate inequalities).
44. Cf. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish
School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
45. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
46. FLA.STAT.ANN. § 236.251 (Supp. 1970).
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based on geography and wealth, the court did not face the problem of
attempting to evaluate a complex scheme whereby millages varied
between geographical units. Also, because of the magnitude of
disparities in locally raised funds available to each district under the
ten-mill limit, the Hargrave court could assume that there were
intrastate educational inequalities without being forced to articulate a
standard by which to evaluate the equality of education.
One possible interpretation of Hargrave is that a state cannot
create classifications based on geography and wealth which result in
unequal educational opportunities absent a compelling state interest.
This rationale can be used to attack the school finance provisions of
all states except Hawaii which has a single, statewide school district."
All financial schemes which rely upon local taxes have created
classifications based on geography and wealth. I f unequal educational
opportunities can be shown to result from this classification,
following Hargrave, the classification would be a denial of equal
protection. In addition, this theory could be used to attack any statute
authorizing local units of government to finance and provide
governmental services if the localities differed in financial means. The
classifications created would still be based on geography and wealth;
however, if an interest less fundamental than education would be
affected, the authorization statute would be reviewed under the
traditional equal protection test and upheld if the classification served
a legitimate state policy--decentralized administration for example.
While Hargrave represents a significant step toward requiring equal
educational opportunity, the problem of articulating standards still
remains 11 The prospective plaintiffs must present ajusticiable issue to
the court. Hargrave, by correctly assuming that unequal education is
a necessary result of a great disparity in expenditures, defines the first
parameter of possible standards and provides a rationale to strike
down classifications made for administrative convenience that create
obviously unequal educational opportunities.
47. Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 13, at 312.
48. For possible standards see A. WIsE, supra note 13, at 163; Coons, Clune, & Sugarman,
supra note 13, at 419; Kurland, supra note 23, at 587; Equal Protection Developments 1187.
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